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I
n 2007, the United States spent more than $650 billion on national 
defense. Even after adjusting for inflation, this was the largest annu-
al amount since 1945, surpassing previous post-World War II peaks 
reached during the Korean, Vietnam, and Cold Wars. Defense spending has 
risen rapidly this decade, today accounting for nearly 5 percent of overall 
gross domestic product—about the same share as residential construction.
National defense represents an even larger share of economic activ-
ity in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. The region is home to some of 
the country’s largest military installations, a number of private defense 
contractors, and a disproportionately large number of reservists and 
National Guardsmen. 
Is the buildup in national defense stimulating the economies of 
the states in the Tenth District?  This article finds that, relative to the 
nation, increased defense spending is likely to help the region more in 
the long run than the short run. Since 2001, defense spending has risen 
more moderately in the district than the nation, due primarily to slower 
growth in the types of defense activities concentrated in the region. 
Still, the region is poised for an expansion of defense spending in the 
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future. And the region benefits from a less cyclical defense sector than 
that of the nation.
The article’s first section looks at the evolution of defense spend-
ing in the United States and reviews research on the effects of defense 
spending on economic growth. The second section discusses the size 
and location of defense activities in the Tenth District and then ex-
plains how defense spending can benefit state and regional economies. 
The third section explores how and why the defense buildup has been 
smaller in the district and how the current buildup compares to past 
episodes. The fourth section examines why projected defense spending 
increases may influence the district and national economies differently.
I.   NATIONAL DEFENSE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
Ever since the United States entered World War II, defense spend-
ing has played an important role in the nation’s economy. This section 
looks at the size of the defense sector in the U.S. economy and how it 
helps shape national economic growth.
How sizable is u.S. defense spending?
The scale of military expenditures in the United States has fluc-
tuated considerably over time. In the decade prior to World War II, 
defense spending accounted for less than 2 percent of GDP (Chart 1). 
During the war, defense accounted for more than a third of the nation’s 
economic activity—a boost many economists have claimed effectively 
ended the Great Depression (Tobin). By 1947, military spending had 
dropped again to about 7 percent of GDP and remained there for sev-
eral years. Then, the Korean War, the Cold War, and later, the Vietnam 
War pushed defense’s share of national output into or near double digits 
throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s. 
By 1979, military spending had declined again to less than 6 per-
cent of GDP. The Cold War buildup of the Reagan Administration 
lifted defense spending back above the 7 percent threshold for several 
years, but by 1986 it began to slow again and by 2000 dipped to a post-
war low of 3.8 percent. Since 2001, defense spending has been rising 
rapidly, last year accounting for 4.8 percent of GDP. Spending on the 
nation’s defense is generally expected to climb further in the near term.         Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  51
does defense spending boost economic growth?
A good deal of economic research has been conducted on the ef-
fects of defense spending on national economic growth. Results of these 
“guns versus butter” studies have been somewhat mixed since the first 
empirical analyses were conducted in the early 1970s.1 Indeed, a de-
tailed survey of the literature published in 1995 concluded there was 
no consistent evidence for either overall positive or negative effects of 
defense spending on national economic growth (Ram). The findings of 
individual studies appear to depend partly on the time frame of focus. 
Theoretically, spending on defense could affect economic growth 
in both negative and positive ways. On one hand, military expenditures 
can impose opportunity costs on a nation. That is, aggregate economic 
growth could suffer as resources used for defense—including capital, 
labor, and land—become unavailable for potentially more productive 
uses that could support long-term economic growth. At the same time, 
defense spending can benefit an economy—for example, by creating or 
maintaining a climate of national security necessary for both domestic 
and foreign private investment to flourish. Other examples of benefits 
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include sizable public infrastructure investments, development of ad-
vanced technology, and skilled training of workers. 
Past research has generally found that increased defense spend-
ing boosts overall economic growth in the short run, especially dur-
ing times of external security threats (Aizenman and Glick; Landau). 
Some researchers also find the long-run benefits of defense spending 
outweigh the long-run costs (Atesoglu 2004). Still, many studies find 
high levels of defense spending are a drag on economic growth in the 
longer run, as productivity is generally found to be higher in other sec-
tors of the economy (Cuaresma and Reitschuler; Mintz and Huang). In 
addition, some researchers suggest that wartime casualties could impose 
both short-term and long-term costs to soldiers and their families that 
are difficult to measure (Blimes and Stiglitz).
Since 2001, U.S. defense spending has risen at about twice the rate 
of overall national economic activity and by much wider margins in 
the earlier part of this period. Recent studies have generally found this 
massive recent defense increase to have provided a boost to overall U.S. 
economic growth, along the lines of 0.5 to 1 percent of additional GDP 
growth per year in the early years of the buildup (Atesoglu 2006; Bak-
er). However, Atesoglu also found that U.S. trade and budget deficits 
have risen as a result of the buildup, and the model used by Baker sug-
gests that the sizable increases in defense spending will begin to have a 
downward effect on employment and GDP between the fifth and tenth 
year of the buildup. 
In short, defense spending remains quite important to the U.S. 
economy. The initial increase in national defense spending in the early 
part of this decade provided a boost to overall U.S. economic growth. 
But whether devoting sizable resources to national defense is beneficial 
in the long term remains an open question.
II.  NATIONAL DEFENSE IN THE TENTH DISTRICT 
As in the nation, the military has long had an important presence 
in the Tenth Federal Reserve District.2 This section looks at the size of 
defense spending in the district and where the spending occurs. It also 
explores some of the ways defense expenditures can influence a regional 
economy differently than the national economy.Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  53
defense spending in the Tenth district—How much and where?
In 2006, defense spending accounted for an estimated 6 percent of 
overall GDP in the Tenth District  —about 25 percent more than in the 
nation (Chart 2).3 The district state with the largest defense presence is 
New Mexico, where an estimated 11 percent of economic output goes 
toward defense. Oklahoma’s defense sector is also considerably larger 
than in the nation, at about 7 percent. (Likewise, defense spending 
accounts for about 7 percent of Missouri’s GDP. But because the vast 
majority of Missouri’s defense spending occurs outside of the Tenth 
District portion of the state, its statewide defense statistics are not in-
cluded in district totals in this article.4)  Defense spending also exceeds 
the national share in Kansas and Colorado.
In comparison to the nation, the Tenth District is much more heav-
ily involved in personnel-related defense spending, as well as in the 
nuclear defense-related activities of the Department of Energy. The 
region also has an estimated sizable presence in “other defense expen-
ditures,” which are largely personnel or base-related.5  Meanwhile, the 
district generally receives far fewer defense contracts than the nation. 
chart 2
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Of course, each individual state is different in its defense spending, and 
even within states some locations are especially concentrated in mili-
tary-related activities. But overall, most district states are fairly similar 
in the composition of their defense spending.
The Tenth District is home to a sizable number of military instal-
lations, some of which are among the largest in the country (Chart 3). 
Given the region’s lack of a coastline, these bases are primarily either Air 
Force or Army, with the Navy and Marines having little presence in the 
region.6 The Air Force accounts for 43 percent of defense personnel in 
the region, compared with just 23 percent nationally. Tinker Air Force 
Base—the nation’s largest—is located in metropolitan Oklahoma City 
and houses more civilian Department of Defense personnel (approxi-
mately 14,000) than any other individual site outside of the Washing-
ton, D.C., area. Ten other Air Force Bases are also scattered throughout 
the district. 
The Army accounts for nearly half of the district’s defense person-
nel, a similar share as in the nation. The region is home to three of 
the country’s 12 largest army bases: Fort Carson in Colorado Springs, 
Colorado; Fort Sill in Lawton, Oklahoma; and Fort Riley near Man-
hattan, Kansas. Together, these three large bases house nearly 50,000 
defense personnel. Each of these bases is also among those that stand 
to gain considerable troops from the latest round of Base Realignments 
and Closures (BRAC 2005).
In addition to traditional military bases, the district has a number 
of unique defense institutions. The U.S. Air Force Academy is located 
in Colorado Springs, and the North American Aerospace Defense Com-
mand (NORAD)—which provides surveillance and control of the air-
space of Canada and the United States—is housed at nearby Peterson 
Air Force Base. In addition, the headquarters of United States Strategic 
Command—which controls the use of the nation’s space defense infra-
structure and nuclear weapons assets—is housed at Offutt Air Force Base 
near Omaha, Nebraska, as is the Defense Department’s weather agency.
Perhaps the most unique defense institutions in the district are actu-
ally part of the U.S. Department of Energy. These include, most promi-
nently, the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in northern 
New Mexico. These two institutions, along with the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory in California, are responsible for—in addition to some nondefense activities not counted in defense spending statistics—
ensuring the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stock-
pile and conducting advanced research on national security issues.
Although Department of Defense contracts are relatively less im-
portant in the district than in the nation, a number of private defense 
contractors nevertheless have sizable presences in the region.7 The larg-
est contractor is The Boeing Company, with total district contracts 
valued at approximately $550 million in 2006, the majority of which 
were located in Wichita, Kansas. Other sizable contractors in the region 
include: Lockheed Martin Corporation in Colorado; Raytheon Corpo-
ration in Kansas; and Northrop Grumman Corporation in Colorado, 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska.
Finally, the district is home to a disproportionately large number 
of National Guardsmen and reservists, individuals who have played an 
increasingly important role in national defense in recent years. In the 
nation as a whole, reservists and National Guardsmen represented 0.61 
percent of total employment in 2006. By comparison, the only state in 
the Tenth District with a smaller share than this was Colorado (0.55 
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percent), while some district states had considerably larger shares, in-
cluding Wyoming (1.01 percent), Oklahoma (0.90 percent), and Kan-
sas (0.85 percent).8 
How does defense spending affect state and regional economic growth?
The ways in which defense spending affects state and regional econ-
omies have both similarities and differences with national effects. As in 
the nation, increased defense spending may boost regional economic 
growth in the short run, while ongoing expenditures could come at the 
expense of potentially more productive private or nondefense govern-
ment investment in the long run. However, since different aspects of 
defense spending can be located in different parts of a country, regional 
effects can differ. In addition, the overall size of the sector in an area 
can also make a difference, as having more defense presence could mean 
more federal tax dollars coming into an area than going out. 
Past research generally finds that at least certain types of defense 
spending can boost an area’s economic activity, especially during short 
periods. For example, investment-type spending (such as for R&D and 
equipment procurement) has a consistent positive effect on state in-
comes, while operations-type spending (such as for service contracts 
and personnel spending) tends to have a positive impact on state em-
ployment, but not incomes (Mehay and Solnick). Likewise, changes 
in defense investment spending have same-direction impacts on state 
economic growth (Hooker and Kettner; Bhattacharya). 
 As for regional differences in the location of the defense industry, 
some regions may be naturally better positioned than others for obtain-
ing military bases or other types of spending. While political consid-
erations undoubtedly play a role in site selections, other criteria are 
important as well. For example, when decisions about military base clo-
sures or realignments are made every few years, the most weight is given 
to the “military value” of a site, which includes its mission capabilities, 
operating costs, and the availability and condition of resources such as 
land and facilities.9 As a historical example, in choosing the location of 
the Los Alamos National Laboratory during World War II, the prefer-
ence was for “a remote, sparsely populated site that would be safe from 
enemy attack, and preferably lie in a natural bowl ringed by hills that 
could contain any accidental explosions” (Weideman). By contrast, de-Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  57
fense contracts tend to be awarded largely to metropolitan areas, where 
defense contractors are heavily located.
In sum, defense spending has a sizable presence in the Tenth Dis-
trict, particularly in terms of the number of defense personnel located 
in the region. The district’s relatively large availability of land and lower 
labor costs may lend it to such a concentration, while its smaller metro-
politan area population may limit its ability to win defense contracts.10  
Since most types of defense spending have been found to have some 
impact on how state economies grow over time, an analysis of the re-
cent defense buildup in the district may help shed light on the region’s 
recent economic performance, as well as introduce ways in which de-
fense spending could affect the district heading forward.
III.  THE RECENT DEFENSE BUILDUP IN THE DISTRICT
Since the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, defense spending in 
the Tenth District has grown fairly rapidly, although less so than in the 
nation. This section looks at the composition and evolution of defense 
spending in the district to help explain why the region has not received 
as much of a defense boost recently and why defense spending appears 
to be less cyclical in the region in general.
Recent defense spending and regional economic growth
Since 2001, real defense spending in the Tenth District has risen 
at an annual rate of about 4.5 percent.11 By comparison, real defense 
spending in the United States has risen at an annual rate of about 7 per-
cent. Among the six district states whose primary defense activities are 
located within the Tenth District, only Nebraska has experienced a larger 
increase in defense spending than the nation since 2001, and its defense 
sector is relatively small compared with most other district states. 
Meanwhile, overall economic growth in the district has been slight-
ly faster than in the nation since 2001. While solid growth in defense 
spending has played a role in bolstering overall regional GDP in recent 
years, the region’s defense boost has clearly been smaller than in the 
nation. In the nation, more than 8 percent of the overall increase in 
GDP since 2001 has come from defense spending (Chart 4).12 The 
share from 2001 to 2003 was even higher  —about 15 percent. Prior to 
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By contrast, for the district, a much smaller share of its increase in GDP 
since 2001 has come from defense spending.
Not only has the defense boost to overall economic growth been 
smaller in the overall Tenth District than in the nation in recent years, 
but it has also been smaller in all six states whose primary defense ac-
tivities occur in the district. The boost in Kansas and New Mexico has 
been near the overall national boost, while defense spending has con-
tributed much less in other district states.
Instead of defense, the district’s stronger economic growth in recent 
years has been driven more by strength in other segments of its econ-
omy, including energy and aerospace, as well as a boom in commer-
cial construction. Still, if regional defense spending had grown at the 
national rate in recent years, the district economy may have outpaced 
national economic growth by an even wider margin. So why has growth 
in defense spending lagged recently in the district?
Chart 4
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Source: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of EnergyBy contrast, for the district, a much smaller share of its increase in 
GDP since 2001 has come from defense spending.
Not only has the defense boost to overall economic growth been 
smaller in the overall Tenth District than in the nation in recent years, 
but it has also been smaller in all six states whose primary defense ac-
tivities occur in the district. The boost in Kansas and New Mexico has 
been near the overall national boost, while defense spending has con-
tributed much less in other district states.
Instead of defense, the district’s stronger economic growth in recent 
years has been driven more by strength in other segments of its econ-
omy, including energy and aerospace, as well as a boom in commer-
cial construction. Still, if regional defense spending had grown at the 
national rate in recent years, the district economy may have outpaced 
national economic growth by an even wider margin. So why has growth 
in defense spending lagged recently in the district?
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Table 1














District* Total Defense Spending 25,623 8,788 -3,985 -2,460 -1,525
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
3,474 2,033 940 561 379
R&D Contracts 963 -211 -1,102 313 -1,415
Service Contracts 4,549 2,055 162 672 -510
Constr/Civil Contracts 870 482 187 135 52
DOD Grants 177 85 16 -6 23
Defense Activities of 
DOE
4,433 1,102 -1,426 -1,458 32
Active Military Payroll 4,452 1,348 -1,007 -759 -248
Civilian Payroll 3,389 1,286 -309 -530 221
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
816 492 245 137 109
Retired Military Payroll 2,500 117 -1,691 -1,524 -167
* Excluding Missouri, due to vast majority of that state’s defense spending occurring outside the Tenth District
Source:  Departments of Defense and Energy
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why has defense spending in the district grown more slowly since 2001?
The district’s slower growth in defense spending in recent years 
could have been due to either a smaller concentration in fast-growing 
aspects of national defense or to less growth than the nation in specific 
types of defense spending. A standard method in regional economics 
for decomposing these two effects is shift-share analysis (see Appendix 
I for a detailed description of shift-share analysis). Table 1 shows the re-
sults of a shift-share analysis of defense spending in the district in recent 
years, which identifies the causes of the region’s slower defense growth 
(full results by state are available in Appendix II).   
From 2001 to 2006, defense spending in the Tenth District grew by 
$8.8 billion. However, if defense spending had risen at the same rate as 
in the nation during this period, the overall district increase would have 
been $12.8 billion, or 45 percent more than it actually was. This $4 
billion “shortfall”—called the total shift in shift-share analysis—can be 
attributed to either the composition of defense spending in the region or 
to regional differences in growth rates within types of defense spending.
For the district as a whole, $2.5 billion of the $4 billion shortfall 
in defense spending since 2001  —or 62 percent of the difference—was 
due to the makeup of defense expenditures in the region, called the 
compositional effect in shift-share analysis. In other words, if each in-
dividual type of defense spending in the region had grown at exactly 
the rate at which that type of spending grew nationally, the district still 
would have experienced $2.5 billion less defense spending growth than 
the nation. Many of the types of defense spending that have grown the 
fastest nationally since 2001—especially Department of Defense con-
tracts—are not highly concentrated in the district. Likewise, most types 
of defense activity in which the region is most heavily concentrated—
including Department of Energy defense activities and most kinds of 
Department of Defense payroll spending—have grown more slowly in 
recent years (Chart 5).13  
The  remaining  $1.5  billion  of  the  shortfall  in  district  defense 
spending since 2001 was due to differences in growth rates between 
the region and the nation for specific types of expenditures, called the 
regional effect in shift-share analysis. In other words, even if the district 
had the same composition of defense spending as in the nation, it still 
would have experienced $1.5 billion less growth in defense expenditures Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  61
because growth in some types of spending was lower than in the nation. 
The type of defense spending contributing the most to this effect was 
research and development contracts. R&D defense spending has actu-
ally fallen in the district during the recent defense buildup, especially in 
Colorado, even while more than doubling at the national level. R&D 
spending has also declined in Nebraska and Oklahoma since 2001 and 
has risen less than the national average in New Mexico. 
This lack of an increase in R&D defense spending in the district 
during a time of national defense buildup could potentially be an area 
of concern for the region’s defense sector, and perhaps for the regional 
economy as a whole. R&D is one of the types of defense spending 
shown to have lasting positive effects on a region’s economic growth. 
The reasons for this weakness in regional R&D defense spending are 
not clear. However, one recent study found that the types of research 
and development needed by the U.S. military has shifted in recent years 
as external threats have become more terrorist group-based, which re-
quires  more  intelligence-systems  technology  than  weapons-systems 
chart 5
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technology (Trajtenberg). As such, it is possible that R&D contracts 
may have shifted out of the district because the types of firms capable 
of producing these new types of technologies could be located in other 
parts of the country.
How do recent trends compare with previous cycles in defense spending?
Not only has defense spending risen less in the district than in the 
nation in recent years, but it was also less cyclical in the preceding two 
decades. Regional defense spending grew less during the last sizable 
U.S. defense buildup—during the first half of the 1980s—but grew 
more in the intervening period from 1986 to 2000. This was true, not 
only for the region as a whole, but also for most states within the dis-
trict (Chart 6). Were these past differences in defense spending growth 
also due primarily to the mix of defense spending in the region, or did 
other factors play a larger role?
Based on the data available, it appears that the mix of defense 
spending in the district was somewhat less responsible for differences 
from the nation in the early 1980s than it has been since 2001 (Appen-
Chart 6
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dix III).14  Specifically, only about 25 percent of the slower growth in 
regional defense spending from 1982 to 1985 can be attributed to the 
composition of defense spending in the region. That means that 75 per-
cent was due to regional differences in growth rates within types of de-
fense spending. This analysis is consistent with the findings of another 
study, which attributed regional differences in defense spending during 
that period largely to political interests (Trubowitz and Roberts).
By contrast, during the long period from 1986 to 2000, the larger 
increase in the district’s defense sector was due largely to the mix of 
spending in the region. Specifically, 75 percent of the overall difference 
from the nation during that period can be attributed to the compo-
sitional effect in shift-share analysis, while only 25 percent was due 
to regional differences in growth rates for specific types of spending. 
Spending on payroll aspects of defense spending increased nationally 
during this period, while defense contracts declined considerably, es-
pecially the supply and equipment contracts that have historically had 
little presence in the district.
While regional differences in growth rates within types of spend-
ing appeared to be a sizable factor in the defense buildup in the Tenth 
District in the early 1980s, the experiences of the last two decades have 
been different. Since the mid-1980s, the primary driver of defense ex-
penditures in the region has been its mix of spending and how each 
type of spending was doing nationally. And throughout this period, de-
fense spending has been less cyclical than in the nation. This relatively 
high degree of certainty about what drives defense activity in the region 
is useful in determining the role that the defense sector is likely to play 
in the regional economy of the future.
IV.   THE FUTURE OF DEFENSE IN THE DISTRICT
National defense is likely to continue to have an important presence in 
the Tenth District economy in coming years and decades. While forecast-
ing the future size of the sector in the region is somewhat difficult, some in-
sights can be drawn based on current national plans for defense spending. 
This section looks at the potential impact of military base realignments 
and other future national defense plans on the district economy.
How will recent base realignment announcements affect the district?64  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
Forecasting one important component of the future of defense 
spending in the district is fairly straightforward. Every few years since 
the late 1980s, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission has 
made recommendations about the future location of military and civil-
ian Department of Defense personnel and bases. The latest round oc-
curred in 2005 and was largely approved by Congress as recommended. 
These base realignments and closures will be implemented between 
2006 and 2010.
The 2005 BRAC round will have little overall effect on the num-
ber of Defense personnel at the national level. By contrast, the Tenth 
District is scheduled to have a net direct gain of more than 11,500 relo-
cated personnel (Appendix IV). In addition, indirect and induced em-
ployment gains are expected to be realized as troops arrive, via spillover 
effects to the local communities.15 The BRAC commission estimated a 
net addition of nearly 8,000 such new jobs for district states, bringing 
the total impact to nearly 20,000 jobs, or 0.15 percent of regional em-
ployment (Chart 7).16 As such, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Colorado are 
chart 7
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projected to have fairly sizable employment increases by the time the 
process is completed in 2010. Specifically, total employment in each of 
those three states is expected to receive a boost of around 0.3 percent.
Of course, the employment boost in these states will largely oc-
cur in specific locations—primarily Colorado Springs, Colorado (Fort 
Carson); Lawton, Oklahoma (Fort Sill); and Manhattan, Kansas (Fort 
Riley). While Colorado Springs is a relatively large metropolitan area, 
with an estimated population of about 600,000 in 2006, the boost to 
its metro employment by 2010 will still be fairly sizable—about 2.4 
percent. Lawton, Oklahoma, is considerably smaller, with a popula-
tion of around 110,000; and so the boost to that area’s employment is 
projected to be an even-larger 9.1 percent. Manhattan, Kansas, has a 
similar population as Lawton but will be getting slightly fewer troops. 
The boost to its employment from the realignment at nearby Fort Riley 
is projected to be 6.2 percent.
The reasons that these and other specific sites were recommended 
for expansion by the BRAC Commission may provide further insights 
into the future of defense spending in the district. For example, one rea-
son forts Riley and Sill were selected was to “take advantage of available 
infrastructure and training land.”  Likewise, Fort Carson was chosen in 
large part because of its “available maneuver training acreage and rang-
es.”  In addition, one reason for consolidating some functions formerly 
stationed at Andrews AFB in Maryland to Tinker AFB in Oklahoma 
City was to “move federal assets out of the National Capital Region, 
reducing the nation’s vulnerability.”  Clearly, the district’s availability of 
open land and distance from possible future targets of terrorist attacks 
were viewed as assets by the BRAC Commission.
How will other future defense spending plans impact the district?
Beyond the relatively certain effects of base realignments on future 
defense spending, forecasting the future role of defense in the region be-
comes more difficult. Each year, however, the Congressional Budget Of-
fice releases a report on the “Long-Term Implications of Current Defense 
Plans.” In the latest document—released in December 2007—projec-
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2008, 2013, 2020, and 2025. Combining this information with knowl-
edge of the structure of defense spending in the district allows for some 
insights into the possible future of the defense sector in the region.
General results of the CBO report showed that current plans call 
for the maintenance of higher levels of real national defense spending 
than “have occurred since the mid-1980s.” Besides the ongoing military 
actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CBO cited four primary factors 
that were likely to keep defense spending at a relatively high level over 
the long term. These included: plans to purchase new military equip-
ment; plans to develop enhanced advanced weapons systems; expected 
increases in personnel pay and benefits; and increasing costs to maintain 
aging equipment and new complex equipment.
As in the past, not all types of U.S. defense spending are expected 
to grow at similar rates heading forward. In 2008, sizable increases are 
budgeted for operation and maintenance expenditures and, especially, 
for supply and equipment procurement (Chart 8). In addition, “Addi-
tional Supplemental and Emergency Funding” is budgeted to increase 
from $173 billion to $189 billion. Spending on military personnel is 
chart 8
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also projected to grow moderately in 2008, while research and develop-
ment spending is expected to fall slightly. On balance, these near-term 
plans—calling for a sizable boost in procurement in particular—suggest 
that defense spending will likely continue to grow slightly faster outside 
the Tenth District over the next year, given the region’s much smaller 
presence in defense contracting.
Longer-term  projections  differ  somewhat  from  the  2008  plans. 
Over the intermediate term—through 2013—fairly similar trends as 
in 2008 hold true, although the rapid growth in procurement is ex-
pected to slow. Longer-term projections through 2020 and 2025, how-
ever, suggest that only spending on military personnel and on operation 
and maintenance are expected to grow. A recent special report in The 
economist (2007) also suggests that future spending on defense is likely 
to focus more on manpower than equipment and technology, given 
the nature of fighting terrorism as opposed to nation-states. Manpower 
aspects of defense spending, of course, are those that are most heavily 
concentrated in the Tenth District, suggesting that defense is likely to 
remain relatively sizable in the region heading forward—at least based 
on these current long-term defense plans. 
Not included in the CBO’s analysis are expectations for growth in 
the defense-related activities of the Department of Energy. However, 
the DOE’s budget appropriations for FY2008 and request for FY2009 
can provide some near-term insights. In 2008, defense-related DOE 
spending was cut by about 6 percent, while the 2009 budget request 
was for a 6 percent increase. So overall, very little change in this type of 
defense spending is anticipated in the near term. The vast majority of 
DOE defense activity in the Tenth District occurs in New Mexico, of 
course, where spending from 2007 to 2009 is expected to be generally 
flat, despite some expected layoffs at Los Alamos.
V.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
National defense has long played a sizable role in the Tenth District 
economy, and most states in the region continue to have a larger defense 
presence than the country as a whole. Yet, the defense sector has grown 
less in the region than in the nation in the defense buildup that began 
in 2001. As such, the region’s economy has received less of a defense 68  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
boost than the national economy. This is primarily because of the types 
of spending that occur in the region—more personnel and base-related 
activity, which have grown moderately across the country, and less de-
fense contracting, which has grown rapidly. Another factor, however, 
is that the region has received far fewer R&D contracts in recent years 
than would be expected.
The experience of the last 25 years suggests that the defense sector 
is much less cyclical in general in the Tenth District than in the nation. 
Defense spending tends to rise less in the district than in the nation 
during massive national defense buildups—such as during the early 
1980s and since 2001—but also to fall less during other periods. As a 
result, the defense sector could potentially have a more stabilizing effect 
and provide fewer shocks to the region’s economy than in some other 
parts of the country.17  
In the years and decades ahead, defense activity is likely to become 
increasingly concentrated in the Tenth District, providing an overall 
boost to regional economic activity. The region stands to benefit from 
the latest round of military base realignments, due in part to its general 
availability of land and relative remoteness. The district is also concen-
trated in those types of defense spending areas expected to grow fastest 
in the longer run—personnel and operations. However, the region’s 
sizable presence in these aspects of defense spending may have some 
downsides as well. Past economic studies have found personnel and 
operations spending to have less impact on boosting regional income 
growth in the long run than other types of defense spending. Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  69
APPENDIx I
 SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSIS
Shift-share analysis is a standard method in regional economics 
for analyzing differences over time in subnational (i.e., local, state, or 
regional) growth rates from national growth rates. It is most often used 
for determining the sources of differences in local employment growth 
from national job growth, but it can also be used to decompose the rea-
sons for state or regional differences in the growth of other economic 
indicators—such as defense spending. 
The total shift component of a shift-share analysis on regional de-
fense spending reveals the difference between actual growth in regional 
defense spending and what growth would have occurred if overall de-
fense spending had grown at the same rate as in the nation. The total 
shift can then be broken down into a compositional effect and a re-
gional effect.
The compositional effect (sometimes also called the structural effect 
or mix effect) reveals how much of this total shift can be attributed 
to the types of defense spending that occur within a region—which 
can often differ substantially from the national breakdown. That is, it 
shows how much more, or less, regional defense spending would have 
grown than in the nation if each specific type of defense spending had 
grown at the national rate.
Then the regional effect (sometimes called the local effect or com-
petitive effect) of shift-share analysis reveals whether defense spending is 
shifting toward or away from an area for reasons other than the original 
composition of spending. That is, it shows which types of regional de-
fense spending grew more or less than would be expected given how that 
type of spending grew at the national level. For defense spending, this ef-
fect could capture things such as political choices about the awarding of 
defense contracts or placement of troops, differences in bids for defense 
contracts across areas, or other purely idiosyncratic effects.
Mathematically, a shift-share analysis can be described by:
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where overall spending in the region of interest is d, and that in the ith ac-
tivity is di; overall spending is the nation is d, and that in the ith activity is 














Colorado Total Defense Spending 7,966 2,622 -1,432 -561 -872
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
1,344 1,049 825 115 710
R&D Contracts 527 -395 -1,095 246 -1,341
Service Contracts 1,932 1,057 393 236 157
Constr/Civil Contracts 323 203 111 41 70
DOD Grants 46 17 -5 -2 -3
Defense Activities of 
DOE
583 -123 -658 -309 -350
Active Payroll 1,386 425 -303 -235 -68
Civilian Payroll 704 239 -113 -117 4
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
120 40 -21 34 -55
Retired Military Payroll 1,000 110 -565 -569 4
Kansas Total Defense Spending 3,578 1,534 -17 -55 38
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
881 348 -56 207 -263
R&D Contracts 75 46 24 8 16
Service Contracts 493 234 38 70 -31
Constr/Civil Contracts 256 186 133 24 109
DOD Grants 46 28 15 -1 16
Defense Activities of 
DOE
0 0 0 0 0
Active Payroll 890 358 -46 -130 84
Civilian Payroll 373 156 -9 -55 46
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
201 135 84 28 56
Retired Military Payroll 363 43 -200 -205 5
Missouri Total Defense Spending 12,214 5,788 912 1,028 -116
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
4,984 1,536 -1,080 1,341 -2,421
R&D Contracts 3,451 2,884 2,454 151 2,302
Service Contracts 753 391 117 98 19
Constr/Civil Contracts 205 74 -25 51 -77
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DOD Grants 46 34 26 -1 26
Defense Activities of 
DOE
343 39 -191 -133 -58
Active Payroll 724 200 -198 -128 -70
Civilian Payroll 552 162 -134 -98 -36
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
583 406 271 75 197
Retired Military Payroll 574 61 -327 -328 0
Nebraska Total Defense Spending 1,690 783 95 -151 246
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
261 202 157 23 134
R&D Contracts 24 -5 -28 8 -35
Service Contracts 342 208 107 36 71
Constr/Civil Contracts 91 75 63 6 57
DOD Grants 11 2 -5 -1 -5
Defense Activities of 
DOE
0 0 0 0 0
Active Payroll 371 104 -98 -65 -33
Civilian Payroll 239 99 -7 -35 29
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
108 70 42 16 27
Retired Military Payroll 244 28 -137 -138 2
New 
Mexico
Total Defense Spending 6,420 2,018 -1,323 -1,355 32
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
208 90 1 46 -45
R&D Contracts 309 148 27 43 -16
Service Contracts 455 152 -77 82 -159
Constr/Civil Contracts 103 29 -26 26 -53
DOD Grants 30 13 0 -1 1
Defense Activities of 
DOE
3,851 1,225 -767 -1,149 381
Active Payroll 505 136 -145 -90 -54
Civilian Payroll 483 155 -95 -83 -12
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
73 42 18 13 5
Retired Military Payroll 405 28 -259 -241 -17
Oklahoma Total Defense Spending 5,362 1,552 -1,339 -302 -1,037
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
671 289 -1 149 -150
R&D Contracts 26 -6 -31 9 -39
Service Contracts 1,279 398 -271 238 -509
Constr/Civil Contracts 93 -12 -91 37 -127Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  73
DOD Grants 33 15 1 -1 2
Defense Activities of 
DOE
0 0 0 0 0
Active Payroll 1,160 291 -368 -213 -156
Civilian Payroll 1,402 484 -213 -231 19
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
153 61 -9 39 -48
Retired Military Payroll 544 33 -356 -327 -28
Wyoming Total Defense Spending 480 153 -96 -37 -59
Supply & Equipment 
Contracts
108 55 14 21 -6
R&D Contracts 1 1 1 0 1
Service Contracts 48 5 -28 12 -39
Constr/Civil Contracts 4 0 -3 1 -4
DOD Grants 12 11 10 0 11
Defense Activities of 
DOE
0 0 0 0 0
Active Payroll 140 34 -47 -26 -21
Civilian Payroll 56 21 -6 -9 3
Reserve/Natl Guard 
Payroll
31 13 0 7 -7
Retired Military Payroll 79 12 -39 -43 4














District* Total Defense Spending** 13,412 3,035 2,522 1,882 639
Supply & Equipment  
Contracts
1,441 -609 -710 -884 174
R&D Contracts 1,174 205 157 -31 188
Service Contracts 2,495 847 766 1,038 -272
Constr/Civil Contracts 388 -61 -83 79 -162
DOD Grants n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Defense Activities of DOE n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Active Payroll 3,104 815 701 428 273
Civilian Payroll 2,103 656 585 227 358
Reserve/Natl Guard Payroll 325 23 8 10 -3













District* Total Defense Spending** 10,377 1,771 -692 -172 -520
Supply & Equipment  
Contracts
2,050 125 -427 142 -569
R&D Contracts 969 150 -85 -13 -72
Service Contracts 1,647 798 555 60 495
Constr/Civil Contracts 449 242 182 116 66
DOD Grants n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Defense Activities of DOE n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Active Payroll 2,289 216 -377 -273 -104
Civilian Payroll 1,447 -16 -435 -198 -237
Reserve/Natl Guard Payroll 302 51 -21 46 -66
Retired Military Payroll 1,224 206 -86 -53 -33
APPENDIx III
 
SHIFT-SHARE ANALYSES OF TENTH DISTRICT  
DEFENSE SPENDING PRIOR TO 2001
*Excluding Missouri, due to vast majority of that state’s defense spending occurring outside the Tenth District
**Excluding grants and defense activities of the DOE, for which detailed data were not available










Colorado Leased Space (11) (11) (22)
Buckley AFB 94 78  172 
Fort Carson 4,377 3,310  7,687 
Peterson AFB 510 375  885 
Schriever AFB 95 85  180 
Air Reserve Personnel Center (108) (54) (162)
US Air Force Academy (40) (32) (72)
Total 4,917 3,751 8,668 
kansas Kansas Army Ammunition Plant (167) (109) (276)
Forbes Field Air Guard Station 247 169  416 
Fort Leavenworth 203 131  334 
Fort Riley 2,855 1,818  4,673 
McConnell AFB 522 308  830 
U.S. Army Reserve Center Wichita (78) (76) (154)
Total 3,582 2,241 5,823 
Missouri* Defense Finance & Acctg Service, Kansas City (613) (549) (1,162)
Marine Corps Support Center, Kansas City (333) (250) (583)
Navy Recruiting District Headquarters, Kansas 
City
(33) (23) (56)
Rosecrans Memorial Airport Air Guard Station 35  23  58 
Whiteman AFB 61  49  110 
Total (883) (750) (1,633)
Nebraska Army Natl. Guard Reserve Center, Columbus (31) (16) (47)
Army Natl. Guard Reserve Center, Grand 
Island
(31) (16) (47)
Army Natl. Guard Reserve Center, Kearney (8) (4) (12)
Naval Recruiting District Headquarters, 
Omaha
(32) (28) (60)
Navy Reserve Center, Lincoln (7) (3) (10)
Offutt AFB (104) (130) (234)
Total (213) (197) (410)
New Mexico* Jenkins Armed Forces Reserve Center, Albq. (36) (29) (65)
Kirtland AFB 206  206  412 
Total 170  177  347 
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Oklahoma Armed Forces Reserve Center, Broken Arrow 6  2  8 
Armed Forces Reserve Center, Muskogee (16) (9) (25)
Army Natl. Guard Reserve Center, Tishomingo (30) (16) (46)
Krowse U.S. Army Reserve Center, OKC (84) (78) (162)
Navy-Marine Corps Reserve Center, Tulsa (32) (11) (43)
Oklahoma City (95th) (53) (55) (108)
Fort Sill 3,602  2,129  5,731 
Tinker AFB 355  450  805 
Tulsa Intnl. Airport Air Guard Station 103  83  186 
Vance AFB 99  94  193 
Altus AFB (16) (10) (26)
Will Rogers World Airport Air Guard Station (15) (49) (64)
Total 3,919  2,530  6,449 
Wyoming Army Aviation Support Facility, Cheyenne (23) (10) (33)
Army Natl. Guard Reserve Center, Ther-
mopolis
(19) (10) (29)
Cheyenne Airport Air Guard Station 79  48  127 
Total 37  28  65 
Total District Impact 11,529  7,780  19,309 
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ENDNOTES
1The phrase “guns versus butter” is believed to have originated from press 
reports about the passage of the U.S. National Defense Act of 1916 that directed 
“the Secretary of Agriculture to manufacture nitrates for fertilizers in peace and 
munitions in war at water power sites designated by the President.”  The phrase 
was most prominently used in relation to the World War II-era German and Cold 
War-era Soviet governments as a way to compare choices on defense spending 
made by those governments relative to other governments. 
2The Tenth Federal Reserve District includes the entire states of Colorado, 
Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wyoming, plus the northern half of New 
Mexico and western third of Missouri.
3Annual regional defense statistics, and their national comparisons, are typi-
cally for fiscal years rather than calendar years.
4Over 90 percent of the defense contracts in Missouri, which make up a 
disproportionately large amount of its total defense spending, go to The Boe-
ing Company—formerly McDonnell-Douglas—located in St. Louis. In addition, 
Missouri’s largest military base, Fort Leonard Wood, as well as three-quarters of 
the state’s defense personnel, are also located outside of the Tenth District. By 
contrast, defense expenditures in New Mexico, only half of which is located with-
in the Tenth District, overwhelmingly occur within the district portion of that 
state, and so it is included in the analysis.
5The estimates for “other defense expenditures” shown in Chart 2, which in-
cludes personnel benefits, depreciation expense, and investment in bases, are sim-
ply a multiplier of payroll spending in each area, based on the ratio of these other 
defense expenditures to payroll at the national level. Historically at the national 
level, payroll expenditures and these other defense expenditures have moved quite 
closely together, especially over the past decade. 
6All military deployed overseas (shore-based) are included in the statistics 
for their parent installation. As of September 2005, all non-shore-based (afloat) 
personnel were included in the strength counts of their homeport locations. Prior 
to this date, all afloat service members were included in payroll data but not in 
the personnel count. This change affects areas with significant concentrations of 
Navy/Marine Corps military personnel, and thus does not have a large impact on 
the Tenth District. 
7Defense contract data by state are for primary contracts only. Subcontract-
ing may occur—and often does—in states other than where the primary contract 
was awarded.
8All reserves and National Guard personnel called to active duty are included 
in the statistics for the parent installation as national guard/reserves, as opposed 
to active military. 
9Less important, but still considered, are the potential costs and savings, the 
economic impact on local communities, the community support infrastructure, 78  FedeRAl ReseRve BAnK oF KAnsAs CiTy
and the environmental impact, according to the Base Realignment and Closure 
statute of 2005.
10Metropolitan statistical areas account for about two-thirds of Tenth Dis-
trict population, compared to more than 80 percent in the nation as a whole.
11From this point on in the article, “defense spending” is taken to mean only 
those categories of spending for which data are available at the state level, that is, 
Department of Defense payroll and contracts, plus the defense-related spending 
of the Department of Energy. At the national level, these categories of spending 
accounted for 70 percent of total defense spending in 2006. 
12These figures do not include “other defense expenditures,” which would 
boost the contribution of defense even higher.
13The primary exception to this general trend was spending on Reserve and 
National Guard personnel, which has grown the fastest of all types of defense 
spending in recent years and is heavily concentrated in the district, so it actually 
has provided a regional boost to defense spending. A recent study by the Con-
gressional Budget Office, though, estimated that both small and large businesses 
that employ reservists as key employees can be negatively impacted financially 
by call-ups, as can the individuals themselves, though the vast majority of U.S. 
business establishments are unaffected (CBO 2005). 
14A detailed shift-share analysis of the defense buildup of the early 1980s is 
somewhat more difficult to conduct than analyses of more recent periods. Data 
for some types of defense spending are not available for that period, specifically 
for Defense Department grants and the defense-related activities of the Depart-
ment of Energy. Moreover, detailed spending data at the state level are not avail-
able prior to 1982.
15The BRAC nondirect impacts are measured by the sum of estimated in-
direct and induced job changes in the community associated with the change 
in Total Direct Jobs. Indirect job changes are the net addition or loss of local 
nongovernment jobs supporting installation material, service, and infrastructure 
needs, such as a local motor pool parts distributors or base operations support 
(BOS) contractors. Induced job changes are the net addition or loss of local non- 
government jobs in industries that provide goods or services to the households of 
direct or indirect installation employees. Examples include local grocery stores, 
retail stores, and restaurants.
16In this case, the “Tenth District” refers to areas within its actual boundar-
ies, including western Missouri and northern New Mexico.
17This is particularly the case since the “other expenditures” component of 
defense spending, for which there are no data available at the state level, consists 
mainly of personnel and base-related functions. As such, if these expenditures 
were included, the district’s defense sector would likely appear even less cyclical.Economic REviEw • SEconD quaRtER 2008  79
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